Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2013

Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent
Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt
Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law School, rch37@cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Property Law and Real
Estate Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hockett, Robert C., "Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt" (2013).
Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 606.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/606

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Volume 19, Number 5 ❖ 2013 ❖ www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues

IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

current issues
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

Paying Paul and Robbing No One:
An Eminent Domain Solution for
Underwater Mortgage Debt
Robert Hockett
In the view of many analysts, the best way to assist
“underwater” homeowners—those who owe more on their
mortgages than their houses are worth—is to reduce the
principal on their home loans. Yet in the case of privately
securitized mortgages, such write-downs are almost impossible
to carry out, since loan modifications on the scale necessitated
by the housing market crash would require collective action
by a multitude of geographically dispersed security holders.
The solution, this study suggests, is for state and municipal
governments to use their eminent domain powers to buy up and
restructure underwater mortgages, thereby sidestepping the need
to coordinate action across large numbers of security holders.
It is now more than six years since U.S. residential real estate prices peaked and
then plunged. Prices dropped nationally by 35 percent and still linger close to
30 percent below peak levels. In harder-hit communities, prices are considerably
more than 50 percent below peak.1 While cyclical fluctuations push prices up for brief
periods, no consistent upward trend has been firmly established (Chart 1). Indeed,
the highest post-bubble price peak prior to March 2013 came not last year or the
year before but in July 2010, while early 2012 saw the deepest post-bubble trough
since April 2009. Prices reached a seasonal peak in September 2012, then leveled off
through February 2013. These fluctuations, highlighted in the moving average change
measure in Chart 1, have been the pattern in home prices since 2009.
While home prices—and hence home equity values—have fallen and remain
low, the fixed debt obligations that buyers had to take on to purchase homes
under bubble conditions have not. Consequently, approximately 11 million
homes, or slightly less than a quarter of all homes with mortgages outstanding,
are “underwater”—meaning that the balance on the mortgage exceeds the
current market value of the home. Of these mortgages, between 3 million and
4 million are in default, in foreclosure, or foreclosed and awaiting liquidation.
Over 2 million more are seriously delinquent—two-to-four payments in arrears
(Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
1 Data are from CoreLogic, available at http://www.corelogic.com/, and from OCC Mortgage Metrics,
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/
index-mortgage-metrics.html.
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Trends in Home Prices: July 2006–March 2013
Based on the Twenty-City Composite Case-Shiller Home Price Index
Percent
2.0
1.5
1.0

3-month moving average
change in HPI
Scale

Case-Shiller HPI
225
215
205

0.5

195
185

0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
-3.0

20-city composite HPI
Scale

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

175
165
155
145
135
125

2012

Source: Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller Home Price Index (HPI).

Recognizing that defaults and foreclosures take a toll on the
economic welfare of communities and the nation as a whole,
many analysts have called for the write-down of principal on
mortgage debt as the most effective solution to the problem of
underwater mortgages. As these analysts attest, write-downs
have the important advantage of raising value.
However, the difficulty lies in carrying out the write-downs.
While principal reduction on mortgages held in bank portfolios
occurs at significant and still growing rates, loans held in
private-label securitization (PLS) trusts have certain structural
features that make such reductions very rare. Specifically, these
loans are subject to pooling and servicing agreements that
would require collective action by a large majority of security
holders before the loans could be modified or sold out of trusts.
Conducting such a collective action across most holders of the
securitized loans would be nearly impossible.
This edition of Current Issues puts forward a strategy for
carrying out the write-downs. Essentially, it recommends that
state and municipal governments use their eminent domain
powers to address the collective action problems that now
prevent the write-down of privately securitized loans. Under
eminent domain, these governments can step in to purchase
underwater loans at fair value, deal directly with the trustees
of the private-label securitization trusts, and sidestep the
rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements. They can
then reduce the principal on these loans, lowering the “water”
and thereby reducing the risk of default.

The Mortgage Debt Overhang: Scope of the Problem
Fewer than half of the nation’s roughly 11 million underwater
mortgages are current, and large numbers of these mortgages

2

go delinquent each month:2 Together with loans that are
already delinquent or in default, 7.5 to 9.5 million additional
homes are expected to go into liquidation over the next several
years absent remedial action.3 These liquidations would further
burden an already depressed market, yielding a backlog of
vacant homes equal to 200 percent of U.S. annual home sales
at the current sales pace (Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012;
Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
For communities, the fallout from these developments is
substantial, with residents forced to give up their homes and
property tax bases weakened—ironically, just as abatement
costs wrought by abandoned properties rise (Hockett 2012a).
Other homeowners lose neighbors and endure the blight and
lost value associated with boarded-up neighboring homes.
Over time, they may see city services cut, school districts
retrenching, and local economies shrinking—an aggregate
monetized loss now estimated at $2 trillion (Hockett 2012a;
Shoen 2012). Though causality is doubtless complex, the fact
that so many counties have been filing for bankruptcy of late
seems unsurprising against this backdrop (Church et al. 2012).
The mortgage debt overhang undermines the health of the
national economy as well. Defaults and foreclosures in the
housing markets feed back into the macroeconomy through
effects upon net worth and spending (Federal Reserve Board
2012; Dudley 2012). And as reduced spending lowers growth
and employment, more mortgages are drawn into foreclosure
(Federal Reserve Board 2012; Dudley 2012; Hockett 2012a,
2012b). Hence the familiar “holding pattern” of high underwater loan and foreclosure rates yielding low growth and
employment, which in turn yield yet more default and foreclosure, and so on (Hockett 2012a, 2012b, 2013).4

The Prudent Solution: Scaled Principal Write-Downs
The most effective means of averting mortgage delinquency,
default, and foreclosure—and the associated economic
costs—is principal reduction. As even creditors recognize,
2 See Olick 2012, Goodman et al. 2012, Ritholtz 2012, and Goodman 2012,
as well as the latest data from CoreLogic and OCC Mortgage Metrics, cited
in note 1 above.
3 See, for example, Fannie Mae 2012 Form 10-Q data, p. 111, available at
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/
2012/q22012.pdf. See also Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; Ritholtz 2012;
Goodman 2012.
4 Of course not all mortgage troubles are attributable to declining home values.
Some homeowners face difficulty keeping current on payments for reasons of
temporary unemployment in a slack economy. For this class of mortgagor, several
colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and I have designed a Home
Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Program, informed by a successful Pennsylvania
program developed during the early 1980s steel slump (Orr et al. 2011). A draft
bill to institute the program, which two of us coauthored, is under consideration in
New York (Campbell and Hockett 2012a, 2012c). But even assuming success here
and in other states, the nation’s larger mortgage debt overhang problem will remain
unaddressed (Campbell and Hockett 2012a, 2012b).

debt loss must be formally recognized in a manner that bears
some intelligible relation to home equity loss. Moreover, for
much underwater mortgage debt, write-downs raise value—a
benefit borne out by the frequency with which portfolio loan
holders write down debt (Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012;
Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
Write-downs are not easily carried out in all cases, however.
Much depends on whether the targeted loans are held in bank
portfolios or by private-label securitization trusts. In the portfolio case, write-downs occur at significant and still growing
rates (Goodman et al. 2012; Goodman 2012; Streitfeld 2011).
Bank officers know that underwater loans foreclose at high
rates, with the result that expected values fall needlessly short
of face values; hence, they find it financially rational to write
down these loans. In so doing, they benefit not only themselves, but also their debtors and the communities in which
they reside. In this case, the interests of all parties converge.
Securitized mortgage loans, however, pose a problem.
While it would be no less rational or beneficial to write these
loans down, certain structural features of the loans—features
that now act as market failures—prevent the rational thing
from being done. The upshot is deadweight loss—loss whose
recoupment and equitable distribution is one object of the
plan sketched below.

Structural Impediments to Write-Downs
What are these structural impediments? A host of classic
collective action problems, reinforced by dysfunctional
contract provisions, stand in the way of the optimal solution
(Hockett 2012a, 2012b; Shiller 2012). For one thing, there is
a last-mover advantage where write-downs are concerned,
owing to the benefits (positive externalities) that accrue to
the creditors on later loans when principal is reduced on
earlier loans. This problem afflicts portfolio loans too, of
course, and probably therefore keeps modification rates lower
than optimal even among banks. But in the case of privately
securitized loans, it is reinforced by additional challenges.
Most decisive among the additional challenges is that so
many of the pooling and servicing agreements governing the
private securitization of loans—agreements drafted during the
bubble years when few foresaw a marketwide housing price bust,
and many rushed either to push or to purchase an innovative
product—require supermajority voting among mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) holders before loans can be modified or sold
out of trusts. And these bondholders, geographically dispersed
and unknown to one another, cannot collectively bargain with
borrowers or buyers on workouts or prices.
Moreover, the agreements governing the loans prevent
trustees and loan servicers, who are duty-bound to act on
behalf of the bondholders and thus could in theory address

their collective action problems, from modifying or selling
off loans in the requisite numbers (Hockett 2012a, 2012b).5
Finally, the agreements typically stipulate compensation
arrangements that make it more profitable for servicers to
oversee lengthy foreclosure proceedings than to seek modification. In sum, then, these contracts now virtually ensure that
mortgage loans will default, harming all interested parties.
Additional complications arise from the fact that many
underwater homes are subject to second liens that secure home
equity lines of credit or closed-end second mortgages. First
lienholders benefit little from loan modifications unless second
lienholders modify too; hence, they are rationally reluctant to
modify on their own. But second lienholders feel less pressure
to modify because borrowers, strapped by post-bust liquidity
needs for which home equity lines constitute precious sources
of credit, are apt to make payments on them first—a reversal
of the legal order of creditor priorities (Goodman 2012).6 In
addition, the second lienholders quite often are banks—the
same banks that service the first-lien-secured loans. That
poses a conflict of interest where firsts prefer that seconds
modify too in order to optimize the benefits that modification brings to firsts, further obstructing agreement among
borrowers and creditors.
Other constraints—including inapplicable bankruptcy
laws and Internal Revenue Code and Trust Indenture Act
uncertainties—impede the kind of collective action that would
benefit both debtors and creditors (Hockett 2012a, 2012b). But
the foregoing discussion suffices to indicate how formidable
the obstacles to principal write-downs can be, particularly for
loans held in private-label securitization trusts.

Bypassing the Impediments through Collective Agency
Solving a collective action problem requires a collective agent.
Of course, that is what PLS trustees and servicers in theory are.
But as we have seen, these agents are often hand-tied or conflicted. Who, then, will act for the creditors and, in so doing,
for homeowners and spillover victims of local foreclosure and
the continuing weakness in the U.S. mortgage market?
As it happens, governments are also collective agents. They
are likewise the sole entities authorized to sidestep the contract
rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements that stand in
the way of broad write-downs for PLS loans. But which government should take up this mantle—federal, state, or local?

5 In some cases, for example, pooling and servicing agreements allow no more
than 5 percent of the loans in the pool to be modified. This percentage, which
shows how little the marketwide crash was expected, has long since been
reached in the case of most loan pools.
6 Lee, Mayer, and Tracy (2012) offer a contrary view, finding that by the time a
borrower goes delinquent on the first lien, there is little credit available on the
home equity line.
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In 2008-09, this author and two others separately advocated
federal action under eminent domain—the power of governments to take private property for public use (Hockett 2009;
Jackson 2008; Willis 2008). In 2010, two higher-profile
advocates, including one member of Congress, added their
names to the call (Miller 2010; Kuttner 2010). But thus far no
action of this sort has been taken, even though other actions
have brought some help.
The federal government’s flagship Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), for example, has accomplished much,
but it is not designed to deal with underwater or “negative
equity” mortgages. For their part, the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been
steered clear of write-downs by their regulator and current
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (Appelbaum
2012). Finally, Congress has twice now attempted but failed to
get mortgaged homes into the Bankruptcy Code, thus leaving
no means for bankruptcy judges to employ their equitable
powers to salvage value among mortgagors and mortgagees
as they routinely do among other debtors and creditors.7
The consequences of our failure thus far to focus on
principal reduction can be seen in more numbers: Since 2007,
little more than 1 percent of underwater home loans have seen
write-downs. Fewer than half of these write-downs have
brought loans above water. Meanwhile, only 2.7 million loans
have been modified in any way by their servicers, while 40 percent of these modifications have reduced monthly payments by
less than 10 percent.8
This weak response is surprising in light of the abundant
evidence, derived from the portfolio loan case, that sizable
write-downs save sizable value (Olick 2012; Goodman et al.
2012; Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012). And it is surprising
too given the compelling evidence, found in the GSEs’ filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, that unmodified underwater PLS loans will default at high rates: For 2006
vintage loans, for example, 71 percent of subprimes, 70 percent
of option adjustable-rate mortgages, 58 percent of variablerate loans, and a surprising 40 percent of traditional fixed-rate
loans have defaulted.9

The State/Municipal Eminent Domain Plan
If it is not to be federal instrumentalities or PLS trustees and
servicers, then, the collective agents best able to address the
structural problems that arise with the pooling and servicing
7 For more on the 2009 and 2010 efforts to pass mortgage “cramdown”
legislation, see Hockett (2012b).
8 See the latest CoreLogic data and OCC Mortgage Metrics, cited in note 1.

agreements on privately securitized loans are state and
municipal governments. These governments (a) face the brunt
of mass foreclosure and its consequences more directly than
the federal government in any event, and (b) have constitutional authority to address these exigencies.10 Let us first
consider how the subfederal units of government can act, then
elaborate briefly on their suitability for these roles.
Using their traditional eminent domain powers—a legal
authority enshrined in our state and federal constitutions
for precisely such exigencies as the foreclosure crisis
presents—states or their sub-units can compulsorily purchase
underwater loans from private-label securitization trusts at
fair value, dealing directly with trustees and sidestepping
all contract rigidities. They can then write down the
loans, reducing default risk and raising expected values
in the process.
If need be, eminent domain authority can also be used
to take second-lien-secured loans at fair value, or even
the liens that secure them, while leaving the notes with
their holders—effectively converting the latter to unsecured
consumer debt. That prospect can bring recalcitrant
second lienholders to the table with firsts—particularly if,
as suggested below, they also are offered some fraction of
the surplus recouped through the write-downs.

Financing the Refinancing: Federal Money,
Private Money, or Both
But how are states or their sub-units to pay for the loans or
the liens, given that the foreclosure crisis has left them more
cash-strapped than the federal government? Here is how:
One possibility is to finance the purchases with monies lent
by federal agencies in the manner of the Treasury’s Troubled
Asset Relief and Public-Private Investment Programs, and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s MBS stabilization programs, all of which ultimately have turned profits.
Alternatively, they might use monies provided by private investors, or monies from both federal agencies and private sources.
The federal agencies or private investors then can be paid from
the proceeds of the refinanced and accordingly more valuable
loans, or in bonds issued against pools of the same.
If private money is used, then the investors both can and
ought to include current bondholders, who might receive
warrants before federal or private investors are brought in.
This approach respects bondholder interests and underscores
the sense in which the eminent domain plan is meant simply
to solve a collective action problem that dysfunctional pooling
and servicing agreements prevent trustees and servicers from
solving themselves on behalf of their bondholder beneficiaries.

9 See Fannie Mae’s second-quarter 2012 Form 10-Q, p. 111, available at

http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2012/
q22012.pdf, and its 2011 Form 10-K data, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/
resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2011/10k_2011.pdf.
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10 Note, however, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac themselves hold

significant numbers of underwater loans in their portfolios.

Basic Structure of the Eminent Domain Plan

Investors:
private and/or
public
$

Overlapping membership

Current MBS
holders

$
$
Eminent
domain
trust

Good loans
$

Bad loans
States/
sub-units

New obligation

$

PLS
trusts

New lending

Homeowners

Notes: The double-headed arrow represents class overlap rather than a flow. The two
vertical arrows crossing the dotted line represent a detour between the “bad loan” and
“good loan” arrows. MBS is mortgage-backed securities; PLS is private-label securitization.

By working with states or municipalities in this manner,
current bondholders would piggyback on governmental
authority to sidestep the contracts that currently preclude
their doing what portfolio lenders already do. To note that
these participating bondholders will be “paying themselves”
less than face value would just be a roundabout way of saying
that they are writing down principal.
The diagram above presents a schematic rendering of
the eminent domain plan. The diagram, which should be
read counterclockwise, shows investors, including current
bondholders and perhaps federal agencies, conveying funds
to eminent domain trusts operated by the states or their subunits. These eminent domain trusts then purchase deeply
underwater (“bad”) loans from private-label securitization
trusts. The states or their sub-units, in most cases probably
advised or otherwise assisted by financial professionals, then
work with homeowners to write new mortgages, replacing
the negative equity loans with modestly positive equity
loans—probably thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages in all
cases.11 Finally, the new (“good”) loans are conveyed to the
first-mentioned trusts, which convey the resultant funds to
the first-mentioned investors.
The payouts will in most cases take the form that payouts on
the earlier, unmodified loans took—bond yields to bondholders.
And, as noted earlier, the new bondholders should include as
many of the original bondholders as wish to participate, since
11 Freeing the loans from their PLS trusts, it bears noting, renders them

amenable to the Federal Housing Administration Short Refinance, Hardest
Hit Funds, and HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative programs.

the aim of the plan is to enable homeowners and bondholders
to do what the pooling and servicing agreements now prevent
them from doing—modifying underwater loans to recoup
presently lost value.
The sequence of steps depicted in the diagram provides
only the broad outline of the plan. More is required to
render any particular variation operational. There are, for
example, the matters of (a) selecting and valuing appropriate
loans; (b) securing government and/or private investors,
if any; (c) commencing the legal proceedings necessary
to exercise eminent domain authority; (d) modifying
and possibly re-securitizing the loans once purchased;
(e) working with homeowners throughout the foregoing;
and (f) compensating investors at appropriate stages.
All of these actions can be managed in various ways
(Hockett 2012a). Briefly, on (a), the guiding criterion should
be whether the loans’ expected value can be raised sufficiently
to offset the write-downs and associated transaction costs.
A variation on this criterion, where public money is available
to supplement private money, might be to include loans whose
expected-value improvements fall slightly short of offsetting
the write-downs and associated transaction costs, in light of
the foreclosure externalities that write-downs will avoid.
On (b), if federal and subfederal units of government find
merit in the plan, they can approach one another to arrange
lending from the former to the latter. Either can also approach
existing bondholders or other investors if desired.
On (c), states or their sub-units will commence the proceedings and courts will conduct them. In the “quick take”
proceedings available in most states, the taking authority
places the estimated value of the loans plus some margin in
escrow when filing, explains the basis of its valuations to the
court’s satisfaction, then takes title. Subsequent litigation, if
any, concerns only whether more should be paid, not whether
the taking can proceed. In most cases, governments have
accurately assessed the value of the loan, often with assistance
from private valuation experts, and paid adequately. This bears
noting in view of popular misconceptions concerning the
likelihood of protracted litigation.
It should also be noted that, in view of the market failure
and consequent waste stories that prompt this proposal, we
can anticipate sizable pre-trial, out-of-court agreements among
state or municipal governments and bondholders on loan
selection and valuation criteria, particularly if relevant federal
officials facilitate.
As for (d), (e), and (f), these are primarily matters for
states or municipalities to manage, albeit again with assistance from public or private financial professionals in most
cases. The municipalities are best situated to approach
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prospective homeowner beneficiaries once qualifying loans
are identified. Financial advisory assistance, in turn—
whether from a federal entity like the Federal Housing
Administration, from private providers, or both—will be
helpful in most cases both in restructuring loans and in
arranging investor compensation.

The Plan’s Legal Basis: Taking Intangibles for Public Purpose
and Paying Fair Value
How commonly is eminent domain used for more than
compulsory land purchases for roads and bridges? Though
non-lawyers are not always aware of the fact, governmental
authorities compulsorily purchase property at fair value for
public use all the time (Hockett 2012a, Section IV). And they
do so with all manner of property—tangible and intangible,
contractual and realty-related alike.
Forms of intangible property that have been purchased
in eminent domain include bond tax exemption covenants,
insurance policies, corporate equities, other contract rights,
businesses as going concerns, and even sports franchises
(Hockett 2012a). Because the law draws no distinctions
between kinds of property that can be purchased in eminent
domain, it is unsurprising that loans and liens in particular,
as one form of contractual obligation among many, are
themselves regularly purchased.12 Among these are
mortgage loans and liens, as the Supreme Court and state
courts have long recognized.13
The question, then, is not what kinds of property can be
taken, but whether a public purpose justifies the taking and
fair value is paid. Preventing more foreclosures, blighted
properties, revenue base losses, and city service cutbacks
is recognized by courts as the most compelling of public
purposes justifying use of the eminent domain authority.14
As for fair value, how is this determined? Won’t municipalities
have to purchase loans at less than fair value to recoup enough
margin to compensate the investors, public or private, who
put up the purchase money?
First, on valuation, there are multiple methods available.
Where mortgage-backed securities associated with a particular
loan pool or analogous pools trade at a discount, for example,
imputation of counterpart discounts to underlying loans is
arithmetically straightforward. And private-label securitization bonds, it bears noting, are trading at very steep discounts.
12 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (accrued
interest on account funds); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)
(materialman’s lien); and the iconic Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall)
457 (1870). See, generally, Hockett (2012a).
13 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602; W. Fertilizer
& Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993). Again, see
Hockett (2012a).
14 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Senior Bond Pricing for Private Label Securitization
Trusts: August 2012

Subprime
Option ARM
Alt-A ARM
Alt-A Fixed
Source: Amherst Securities.

Price as a
Percentage of
Senior Bond
55.7
58.5
66.7
73.1

Senior Bond
Percentage of Total
90.0
90.0
90.0
90.0

Price as a
Percentage
of Loan UPB
50.1
52.7
60.0
65.8

Notes: UPB is unpaid principal balance. ARM is adjustable-rate mortgage;
Alt-A is Alternative-A, a risk classification between prime and subprime.

The latest data from Amherst Securities on PLS senior debt,
for example, are telling, as are estimates of senior bonds as
percentages of total bonds outstanding and prices thereof
as percentages of unpaid principal balances (see table above).
Where bond-to-loan discount-imputation is unavailable
owing to missing markets, discounted cashflow methods will
do. As noted above, for example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
publish expected default rates for sundry classes of underwater PLS mortgages each year. From these—along with
foreclosure costs, associated recovery rates (generally no more
than 22 percent on defaulted loans), and discount rates—the
calculation of net present values is not a recondite exercise.
And our courts, which routinely hear valuation arguments in
multiple contexts and often impanel experts, will oversee the
proceedings as required by law, ensuring fairness to parties.
Even this safeguard might be more than is necessary, however,
if federally overseen valuation summits of the kind mentioned
above and discussed further below should prove workable.
What about the putative need to pay current investors
less than fair value to compensate new ones? Must one
rob Peter to pay Paul? The answer is no. Eminent domain
proceedings need not represent “zero sum games.” By averting market failures—and the needless sacrifice of value
that these failures entail—the plan proposed here recoups
value, which can then be equitably distributed to render all
stakeholders better off.
First lienholders who help finance the purchases from their
PLS trusts receive loans that are higher in expected value in
exchange for loans with lower expected value. First lienholders
who do not thus participate receive fair value for otherwise
unmarketable assets. (This is so even if trustees in some cases
must divide proceeds among subclasses.) Homeowners receive
modest equity in their homes and diminished default and
foreclosure risk. Neighbors see their communities, property
values, and municipal services stabilized, while municipalities
see property tax revenues restored and abatement costs drop.
Even second lienholders can benefit if paid a small fraction of

Underwater Mortgages as a Share of All Mortgages, by County
As of Fouth-Quarter 2012

 0% to 25%
 25% to 35%
 35% to 45%
 45% to 55%
 55% and above

Source: CoreLogic Negative Equity Report.

the value recouped by the write-downs, since in foreclosure
they receive nothing.

Why the National Problem Is First a Local Problem
It was suggested earlier that state and local governments might
be better situated than the federal government to take the lead
in pursuing a plan like that sketched in this article—even if
federal instrumentalities might play helpful supporting roles.
Why is this the case? In what sense do localities face the worst
of the mortgage debt overhang problem, and thus have incentive to act first?
The answer is that even though the problem is ultimately
national in scope, its worst symptoms are locally concentrated.
In some communities, more than 80 percent of PLS loans are
underwater. The degree to which the loans are underwater,
moreover, can be dramatic: some communities’ underwater
PLS loans have average loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater

than 200 percent, and many more have ratios approaching
that number. The map above affords a telling, if understated,15
picture of how localized the worst of the nation’s underwater
mortgage problems actually are.16

Concerns Raised by the Eminent Domain Plan
While it is not possible here to anticipate and fully address
all concerns that the eminent domain plan might invite,
one can cover the most obvious ones in broad outline.
These fall under two headings—concerns of the sort that
debt write-downs seem always to raise, and concerns
relating to the reliance on state rather than federal
authority to implement the plan.
15 The chart covers all underwater loans, and does not distinguish high-LTV
loans from lower-LTV loans.
16 CoreLogic Negative Equity Report, Fourth-Quarter 2012, available at
http://www.corelogic.com/.
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Debates over the justice and efficiency of debt forgiveness
are long-standing. Critics say that contracts are binding
commitments that must be upheld, while proponents of debt
forgiveness say some debts are “odious.” Again, critics say
that write-downs induce moral hazard and reduce credit
availability, while proponents observe that you cannot
squeeze blood from turnips. We are not going to settle
such perennial questions here, any more than the Book of
Leviticus or centuries of “law versus equity” have done. But
three things bear noting.
First, owing to asset-price bubbles’ status as collective
action problems, it is doubtful that many homebuyers during
the bubble years had much choice when it came to buying
overvalued homes. That most homes were overvalued is what
rendered the bubble a bubble. It therefore seems mistaken
to blame homeowners as a class, or to characterize writedowns as per se unfair or morally hazardous. It is also easy to
formulate loan-selection criteria in ways that do not encourage
“strategic” defaults going forward—by reference to LTV/default
correlations as suggested above (Hockett 2012a, 2013, 2010).
Second, for similar reasons, there seems little need to
fear long-term contraction in liquidity or credit. Bubbles
inflate only when credit is overabundant. We want, then,
some credit-caution in future, just not too much. And we
want to get to that middle ground as quickly as possible. The
best way to do this is first to clear out the overhang under
which 11 million homeowners still struggle, then to ensure
that the pooling and servicing agreements for residential
mortgage-backed securities going forward look more like
the agreements for commercial mortgage-backed securities
always have looked—providing in advance for value-salvaging
modifications on a scale unanticipated before the most recent
crisis, and thereby preempting the future need to resort to
such methods as the one proposed here.17 New residential
mortgage securitizations suggest that the latter change is
already under way. To resolve what earlier securitizations have
wrought, however, requires a plan like that outlined above.
Finally, it is important to recall that write-downs are done
on nonmortgage debt all the time. We call it bankruptcy, and
afford it to firms because it salvages value. The plan proposed
here does the same. And as noted above, the value thus saved
can be shared among all stakeholder classes.
Turning now to issues linked to the plan’s reliance on
state, rather than federal, authority, we find some concerns
stemming from possible differential application of the
eminent domain plan across states and localities. Florida
counties, for example, might construct variants of the
plan that differ from those adopted by Louisiana parishes.
California or Michigan plans might diverge from both. Would
such differences raise fairness concerns?
17 For more on the differences between RMBS and CMBS pooling and
servicing agreements, see Hockett (2012b).
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The question is a complex one. We should certainly
welcome some degree of national uniformity (this is one
reason the present author [2009] first proposed federal,
not state or local, action in 2008). But local conditions
do vary from county to county, such that fairness itself
dictates some variation. It is also the case that our federal
system already involves quite significant state variation
with respect to all manner of law—from property, tort, and
even commercial law to electoral law. There will be nothing
particularly unusual, then, in differing states’ crafting
differing variants of the plan here proposed. It might even
be welcome—for the usual “laboratories of democracy”
reasons given for local experimentation.
All of that said, however, federal agencies could be helpful
in confining local variation within reasonable bounds, as
well as in promoting efficient and amicable loan workouts
nationwide along lines like those here proposed. By bringing municipal or state, homeowner, bondholder, and bank
representatives together under one “summit” structure, the
Treasury, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve
Board or regional banks like the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York operating thereunder, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or some combination thereof
could facilitate consensus among all concerned parties on the
basic contours that all local variants of the eminent domain
plan should take. There is no reason this consensus could not
include loan-selection and loan-valuation principles as well as
more detailed practical elements.

Conclusion: It Takes a Village—but a Federal
Government Helps
The guiding ideal in any such summit as that proposed
here should be to convert the eminent domain tool into a
mere formality enabling all interested parties to sidestep
dysfunctional pooling and servicing agreements consensually
and thereby recapture lost value. Getting past these contracts
and the collective action problems they underwrite is, after
all, precisely and solely what this plan is for. States and their
sub-units are best situated at this point to act. But federal
agencies could be helpful facilitators for all.
The author thanks Kaushik Basu, Michael Campbell,
Thomas Deutsch, Laurie Goodman, Howell Jackson,
Darius Kingsley, Christopher Mayer, Brad Miller, Lawrence
Rufrano, Robert Shiller, Joseph Tracy, Lauren Willis, and
other colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the
International Monetary Fund, the Treasury Department,
and the World Bank, as well as in the academy, for helpful
comments. The views expressed are nevertheless his own
and not attributable to others absent express confirmation.
Some of those named here oppose the proposal.
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